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ABSTRACT 
 In its recent decision in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a property tax implemented by the 
City of Valdez violated the Tonnage Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the 
United States Constitution. In this Note, the Author argues that the Supreme 
Court incorrectly interpreted the Court’s prior Tonnage Clause 
jurisprudence. The Author begins by outlining the factual background of the 
dispute between Polar Tankers, Inc. and the City of Valdez. Next, the Author 
provides a historical overview of the Tonnage Clause, discussing both the 
Framers’ intent in drafting the clause and the Supreme Court’s evolving 
Tonnage Clause jurisprudence. He then summarizes the decisions of the 
lower courts in the Polar Tankers case, as well as the Supreme Court 
members’ plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Finally, the Author 
argues that the Court misinterpreted prior Tonnage Clause jurisprudence, 
and that a proper interpretation compels the conclusion that the property tax 
imposed by the City of Valdez did not violate the Tonnage Clause. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Framers of the Constitution, when they convened to write the 
document that would define the scope of federal power and determine 
the “fate of an empire,”1 were, for the most part, exceptionally wary of 
the rivalries that existed among the independent states. They believed 
that such rivalries, if left unchecked, would cripple the fledgling nation.2 
Since the end of the Revolution, the Founders had witnessed interstate 
rivalries foment firsthand as the separate states freely pursued their own 
interests, unrestrained by a federal government largely devoid of power 
under the Articles of Confederation.3 Thus, the Framers sought to stem 
 
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). Though the avowed 
purpose of the delegates who met in Philadelphia for the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 was to revise the Articles of Confederation, the result was 
the creation of a new, more powerful national government. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 40 (James Madison); EDWIN MEESE, ET AL., THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO 
THE CONSTITUTION 178 (2006); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND 
TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 99 (2007) (stating that the Founders 
recognized that “the Articles of Confederation did not need to be revised, they 
needed to be completely replaced with a fully empowered national government 
that possessed a clear mandate to coerce the states in . . . domestic policy.”). 
 2. See, e.g., JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND ITS AMENDMENTS 44 (4th ed. 2006) (noting the “[F]ramers’ concern over state 
rivalry”); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 43, 53 (1988) (arguing that “[i]nterstate rivalry was the Convention’s 
greatest concern”). 
 3. See, e.g., JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 274 (2003) (“All nationalists concurred that the power of the 
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the potential conflict that would arise among those states with a 
geographic advantage and those without, recognizing that certain states 
with access to shipping lanes or natural resources would be able to 
leverage their superior situation to the detriment of their neighbors.4 To 
that end, the Constitution that arose from the Philadelphia Convention 
contained provisions to facilitate trade among the states.5 Among these 
provisions was the Tonnage Clause, which prohibits individual states 
from placing any duties on vessels when those duties “operate to 
impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a 
port.”6 Through the nation’s first century and a half, the Supreme Court 
addressed the Tonnage Clause with relative frequency; the Clause, 
however, has taken on decreased importance in recent history.7 
The United States Supreme Court in Polar Tankers held, in a 7-2 
opinion (though the simplicity of that figure obscures the fact that the 
Court split along multiple lines), that a tax imposed by the City of 
Valdez, Alaska, on ships making use of its harbor was an 
unconstitutional levy imposed for the privilege of using Valdez’s ports, 
and was consequently a violation of the Tonnage Clause.8 In deciding 
that the Valdez tax violated the Tonnage Clause, the Supreme Court 
overturned the decision of the Alaska Supreme Court, which had held 
that the tax was not a duty on tonnage in violation of the constitutional 
prohibition but was instead a “fairly apportioned ad valorem tax9 on 
personal property.”10 The courts at both levels examined previous 
Tonnage Clause cases, which have shown a marked evolution in the 
meaning and application of the Clause since its inception.11 
Additionally, at the Supreme Court level, all of the opinions—plurality, 
concurrence, and dissent—relied heavily on earlier interpretations of the 
 
states had to be reduced . . . [and insisted] that the states ‘pursued their own 
whimsical Schemes,’ indifferent to the national interest.”). 
 4. See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2282 (2009) 
(citing 3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 519, 542 (1966)); see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 5. This includes the Commerce Clause and the Import/Export Clause, 
discussed infra Part II.B. 
 6. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2282 (citing Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex 
rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265–66 (1935)). The history and 
application of the Tonnage Clause is discussed at length infra Part II. 
 7. The Supreme Court dealt with cases involving the Tonnage Clause only 
sparingly throughout the twentieth century. 
 8. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2282, 2287. 
 9. An “ad valorem tax” is “[a] tax imposed proportionally on the value of 
something . . . rather than on its quantity or some other measure.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1496 (8th ed. 2004). 
 10. City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d 614, 622 (Alaska 2008). 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
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Tonnage Clause to divine the intent of the Framers in reaching their 
respective conclusions.12 
Part I of this Note discusses the background of the dispute over the 
Valdez tax, in an attempt to put the litigation into perspective. Part II 
examines the Tonnage Clause generally, focusing on the Framers’ intent 
as well as the evolution of the Tonnage Clause throughout Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. Part III closely examines the decision at the Alaska 
Superior Court and Alaska Supreme Court levels and proceeds to 
evaluate the three distinct approaches elucidated in the fractured United 
States Supreme Court opinion. Finally, Part IV takes the position that the 
United States Supreme Court misinterpreted previous Tonnage Clause 
cases when it decided against the City of Valdez. The Note then uses 
elements of both the Supreme Court’s plurality and dissenting opinions, 
as well as the opinion of the Alaska Supreme Court, to argue that the 
Valdez tax was, in fact, a valid property tax that did not violate the 
Constitution.13 
I.  THE DISPUTE 
The 2009 Supreme Court decision in Polar Tankers concluded a 
decade-long dispute between the City of Valdez, which imposed the tax 
in question, and the various oil shipping companies that were subject to 
it. Though the Framers could not have foreseen the effects the Tonnage 
Clause would have on a city 3500 miles removed from Independence 
Hall, they would no doubt have been unsurprised by the fact that the 
recent litigation, well over two hundred years removed from the 
Clause’s ratification, was focused on a valuable commodity abundant in 
one state and desired by the rest. 
A.  The Pipeline 
As petroleum production in the United States began to slow in the 
late 1960s, a new source of oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay on the 
North Slope of Alaska.14 After its discovery in 1968, a system was 
 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Though the original complaint brought by Polar Tankers alleged 
violations of the Commerce and Due Process Clauses in addition to the Tonnage 
Clause claims which were argued at both the State Superior and State Supreme 
Court levels, the Supreme Court’s opinion “begin[s], and end[s], with Polar 
Tankers’ Tonnage Clause claim.” Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2281. Accordingly, 
this Note will focus exclusively on the Tonnage Clause claim. 
 14. See Energy API, History of Northern Alaska Petroleum Development, 
http://www.api.org/aboutoilgas/sectors/explore/historyofnorthalaska.cfm. 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
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needed to transport the crude oil from the reserves above the Arctic 
Circle to refineries in the lower forty-eight states.15 Construction of the 
Trans Alaska Pipeline System, which carries oil south over 800 miles 
from Prudhoe Bay to the Marine Terminal at Valdez,16 the northernmost 
ice-free port in North America and the southern terminus of the Trans 
Alaska Pipeline System,17 was completed in 1977.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On August 1, 1977, the freighter ARCO Juneau departed from the 
port at the City of Valdez, carrying the first oil transported from the 
 
 15. L.J. Clifton & B.J. Gallaway, History of Trans Alaska Pipeline System, 
available at http://tapseis.anl.gov/documents/docs/Section_13_May2.pdf. 
 16. See PBS, Timeline: Alaska Pipeline Chronology, http://www.pbs.org/ 
wgbh/amex/pipeline/timeline/index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Company, Pipeline Quick Facts, http://www.alyeska-
pipe.com/pipelinefacts.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009); see also map of the Trans 
Alaska Pipeline System, http://www.d.umn.edu/~hoef0049/ pipelinemap.html 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 17. See Brief for the Petitioner at *2, Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2009 WL 
191838 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 18. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *1, Polar 
Tankers, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2008 WL 4893773 (Nov. 10, 2008). 
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North Slope.19 Since that first departure, over fifteen billion barrels of oil 
have been transported from Prudhoe to the ports at Valdez.20 
Given its valuable oil stores, Valdez maintains a “substantial and 
continuous relationship with oil tankers and related vessels.”21 A 
number of petroleum companies collectively own, through subsidiary 
shipping companies, the Trans Alaska Pipeline System, and these 
companies transport the oil from Alaska to refineries along the West 
Coast of the United States and in Hawaii.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the first shipment through April 2008, over 19,600 of these 
tankers had been loaded and shipped out from the port at Valdez to 
various refineries.23  
Polar Tankers, Inc., a subsidiary of ConocoPhillips, owns tankers 
that transport oil from the Valdez Marine Terminal to refineries in the 
 
 19. See Clifton, supra note 15. 
 20. See PBS, supra note 16. 
 21. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 
*1. 
 22. Id; see also map, “Routes from Valdez for tankers carrying Alaska North 
Slope crude oil,” http://tapseis.anl.gov/guide/photo/Tanker_Route_Map.html 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 23. See Pipeline Quick Facts, supra note 16. 
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lower forty-eight states and Hawaii.24 Polar Tankers’ ships spend an 
average of forty-five days per year in the City of Valdez port,25 and it is 
estimated that the presence of ships like Polar Tankers’ adds an average 
of 550 extra people to the City’s population each year, representing 
greater than a ten percent increase in the City’s total population.26 This 
influx in population results in an increased use of municipal services, 
including various utilities, law enforcement and emergency response 
systems.27 
B.  The Tax 
Prior to 2000, all personal property in the City of Valdez was 
exempt from property tax.28 In 1999, facing a “serious erosion of the 
city’s tax base”29 and a budget shortfall, the city repealed the personal 
tax exemption.30 The city adopted a vessel tax under Ordinance No. 99-
17, which it categorized as an “ad valorem property tax.”31 The 
Ordinance, later codified into the Valdez Municipal Code, imposed a 
property tax on “[b]oats and vessels of at least 95 feet in length.”32 
The Municipal Code includes exceptions to the blanket tax on 
ships, excluding vessels “used primarily in some aspect of commercial 
fishing”33 and vessels that “dock[] exclusively at the Valdez Container 
Terminal.”34 As a practical matter, this limits the personal property tax 
to “oil tankers and vessels that escort or assist oil tankers” in the port of 
Valdez.35 Importantly, however, the city also applies the same two 
percent tax rate to all other property that it taxes, “including mobile 
 
 24. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2281 (2009). 
 25. Brief for Respondent at *1, Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2009 WL 507023 
(Feb. 26, 2009). 
 26. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 
*1. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at *3; Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at *3, Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2008 WL 4155609 (Sept. 8, 2008). 
 29. City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d 614, 616 (Alaska 2008). 
 30. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 17, at *3; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 28, at *3. 
 31. Polar Tankers, 182 P.3d at 616. 
 32. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2281 (2009); see also 
VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020 (2008) (codifying the Ordinance). 
 33. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020 (2008). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at *3; see also Polar Tankers, 
129 S. Ct. at 2281. 
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homes, trailers, recreational vehicles, [and] oil and gas production and 
pipeline property.”36 
The Municipal Code, in section 3.12.020, states that these vessels are 
“subject to taxation at their full and true value,”37 and section 3.12.010 
states that “[a]ll property not expressly . . . exempted from taxation by 
the city . . . shall be subject to annual taxation at its full and true value 
based upon the actual value of the property assessed.”38 Thus, the 
measure of the vessel tax is similar to the property tax on any other item 
of personal or real property taxed in Valdez and is based on the assessed 
value of the ships39 rather than on the vessels’ tonnage capacities or on 
the aggregate volume of their holds.40 
The ships must also have acquired a “tax situs”41 with the City in 
order to be taxed under the Municipal Code. A ship acquires a tax situs 
if it is “usually kept or used within the city, whether regularly or 
irregularly”;42 “[t]ravels to or within the city along fixed and regular 
routes”;43 has been kept or used within the City for ninety days or more 
in the previous twelve months;44 or “takes on cargo within the city [that 
has] a cumulative value in excess of one million dollars during the tax 
year.”45 Though this will easily capture the large ships of the major 
shipping companies that transport oil from Valdez’s Marine Terminal 
and “routinely carry millions of barrels of oil at a time worth well in 
excess of [the] $1 million [threshold],”46 the tax situs requirement 
prohibits the City from taxing ships “merely for the privilege of entering 
or leaving the port.”47 
The revenue received from the tax is used to pay for various 
municipal services provided by the City to all its residents, which 
 
 36. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at *3–
4 (citing VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.022(A) (2008) (“The property taxes levied 
against [property] classified as real property may be collected in accordance 
with the procedures established for collection of personal property taxes within 
the city.”)). 
 37. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 38. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.010 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 39. The City Assessor is instructed to “allocate to the City the portion of the 
total market value of [each vessel] that fairly reflects its use in the City.” Brief in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at *4. 
 40. See Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2291 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 41. A “tax situs” requires a jurisdiction to have “a substantial connection 
with assets that are subject to taxation.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1503 (8th ed. 
2004). 
 42. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020(C)(2)(a) (2008). 
 43. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020(C)(2)(b) (2008). 
 44. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020(C)(2)(c) (2008). 
 45. VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020(C)(2)(e) (2008). 
 46. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2009). 
 47. Id. at 2292 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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necessarily includes employees of the shipping companies who use 
those services.48 The personal property tax “enables the City . . . to 
provide police protection, fire protection, a local hospital with 
ambulance services, a municipal airport, construction and maintenance 
of roads and transportation facilities, a post office . . . and maintenance 
of other city infrastructure.”49 
II.  THE TONNAGE CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Polar Tankers is rife with 
commentary attempting to determine the Framers’ intent in including 
the Tonnage Clause in the Constitution.50 In spite of a general agreement 
on the purpose of the Clause and the Framers’ goals in including it, the 
Court members reached drastically different conclusions as to how the 
Framers’ intent should manifest itself in interpreting the Tonnage 
Clause.51 
A.  “No State Shall . . . Lay Any Duty of Tonnage . . .” 
Added to the Constitution in the “waning days of the Philadelphia 
Convention,”52 the Tonnage Clause provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o 
State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any duty of 
Tonnage.”53 The term “duty of Tonnage,” as used in the Constitution, 
refers to a tax “imposed on ships, based on their cargo capacity, for the 
 
 48. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at *4; 
see also City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d 614, 616 (Alaska 2008). 
 49. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at *9 
(citing City of Valdez, Draft Budget (2009), available at http://www.ci. 
valdez.ak.us/documents/2009DraftBudgetCouncilReview.pdf). 
 50. See, e.g., Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2282 (“In writing the Tonnage Clause, 
the Framers recognized that, if the states had been left free to tax the privilege of 
access by vessels to their harbors,” they could have gained an advantage over 
their neighbors); id. at 2288 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The free flow of 
maritime commerce was . . . important to the Framers); id. at 2289 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he purpose of the Clause is to prevent States with convenient 
ports from abusing the privileges the natural position affords.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2282, 2288 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 
2289 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 52. BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE § 12.10 (1999). 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Tonnage Clause was inserted into 
Article I with other general prohibitions on the states. The full text of the third 
clause of Section 10 states: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay 
any duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into 
any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or 
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not 
admit of delay.” Id. 
SUOZZI_FMT3.DOC 12/11/2009  3:10:54 PM 
298 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:2 
privilege of entering or leaving a port.”54 This interpretation was also 
meant to distinguish a prohibited tax from the acceptable practice of 
assessing fees to ships based on their use of specific services, such as 
wharfage,55 towage,56 or pilotage57 fees.58 As will be seen infra Part II.C., 
this seemingly simple provision has evolved since its inception as the 
Supreme Court has expanded the Clause’s reach in certain areas and 
contracted it in others. 
B.  Framers’ Intent and Historical Importance 
Following the Revolution, some of the Founders, in favor of a 
powerful national government and confronted with a strong anti-central 
government sentiment,59 set about to “assure national supremacy in . . . 
relations among the States.”60 Allegiances at the time “remained 
primarily local; they then clustered into state-based loyalties, then 
periodically enlarged to regional affinities and interests,”61 but interests 
and loyalties of the people rarely manifested themselves on a national 
level in post-Revolutionary America.62 
On the political front, vocal proponents of the national government, 
such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, felt great 
apprehension towards the largely unbridled power of the states under 
the Articles of Confederation. The Founders were concerned that the 
union of necessity formed to fight the British would break apart, and 
America would “go the way of Europe,” with three or four large 
confederacies, unified by geography and local interests (mostly 
 
 54. BITTKER, supra note 52, § 12.10. “Tonnage” generally is the “capacity of a 
vessel for carrying freight or other loads, calculated in tons.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004). The Framers, however, meant “tonnage” to refer 
not necessarily to the weight-carrying capacity of the vessels, but instead 
primarily to the “internal cubic capacity of a vessel.” Clyde Mallory Lines v. 
Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265 (1935) (citing Inman S.S. 
Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876)). 
 55. The fee paid for landing, loading, or unloading goods on a wharf. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (8th ed. 2004). 
 56. The act or service of towing ships and vessels. Id. at 1528. 
 57. Compensation that a pilot receives for navigating a vessel. Id. at 1186. 
 58. BITTKER, supra note 52, § 12.10. 
 59. After all, a war had just been waged and won in the name of casting off 
the “absolute Tyranny” of the British monarchy. THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 60. MEESE, ET AL., supra note 1, at 178. 
 61. ELLIS, supra note 1, at 88. 
 62.  See id. 
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commercial in nature), springing up on the American landscape and 
competing with one another for continental supremacy.63 
In the economic arena, the biggest obstacle to the success of the 
newly unified Republic was the proliferation of local interests 
superseding the greater national economic interest. Under the system 
established by the Articles of Confederation, regulation of trade was left 
primarily to the states.64 Self-interested states were in constant conflict 
with one another and had blocked efforts to facilitate interstate trade, 
instead opting to act in whatever way best suited the members of their 
particular state.65 
The Framers recognized the problem inherent with a system of 
unregulated states with the freedom to impose trade restrictions on one 
another. The primary issue, Hamilton and Madison (among others) 
realized, was the geographic supremacy that some states possessed as a 
result of their superior natural resource base or the ease of access to the 
channels of interstate and international commerce.66 At the time, this 
supremacy was primarily focused on access to major rivers and the 
Atlantic Ocean.67 The Framers proffered multiple examples of how 
states had in the past, and could in the future, harm each other’s trade, 
and they warned of the inevitable conflict that would arise in the course 
of economic competition among the states.68 The Framers were 
 
 63. FERLING, supra note 3, at 274. Though Madison was concerned about 
general “anarchy,” which he interpreted as a war between individual states, it 
was clear that three or four separate confederacies, rather than outright anarchy, 
was the most likely alternative in the absence of a strong federal government; see 
also ELLIS, supra note 1, at 93–94. 
 64. Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of the American Common Market, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 423 (2008) (discussing the Framers’ fear of parochialism 
in the economic context). 
 65. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11 (1824) (stating that under the 
Confederation, “[t]he States could still, each for itself, regulate commerce, and 
the consequence was, a perpetual jarring and hostility of commercial 
regulation.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (criticizing 
the states for their “interfering and unneighborly regulations,” which were 
“contrary to the true spirit of the Union”). 
 66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It happens, indeed, that 
different portions of confederated America possess each some peculiar 
advantage . . . .”). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 497 (4th ed. 2008) (“What could New York do with a single sea-
port, surrounded on each side by jealous maritime neighbors with numerous 
ports? . . . What could Pennsylvania oppose to the keen resentments, or the facile 
policy of her weaker neighbour, Delaware?”); James Madison, Preface to Debates 
in the Convention of 1787 (stating that Rhode Island, under the Articles of 
Confederation, enjoyed an “advantage which her position gave her of taxing her 
neighbors thro’ their consumption of imported goods,” an advantage which 
would have disappeared under a strong federal Constitution; Madison claimed 
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convinced that each independent state “would pursue a commercial 
policy peculiar to itself”69 and further noted that these policies would be 
drastically different, as interests varied widely from state to state.70 The 
great concern was that if states were given the power to tax other states 
for the privilege of using their ports or otherwise restrict trade among 
the states generally, then each state would grow frustrated, retaliate 
with tariffs and restrictions of their own,71 and “sink back into listless 
indifference or gloomy despondency.”72 
Faced with a “veritable kaleidoscope of local interests with no 
collective cohesion whatsoever,”73 the Framers at the Philadelphia 
Convention sought to create a strong national government capable of 
restraining each state from pursuing its own independent political and 
economic goals at the expense of the whole. Specifically, the focus and 
primary purpose of the Convention was the regulation of commerce;74 
the principal aim of the Founders was to “lay the groundwork for . . . 
 
this was the impetus for Rhode Island’s failure to send representatives at the 
outset of the Constitutional Convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be taxed by 
New York for her exclusive benefit?”). 
 69. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 70. ELLIS, supra note 1, at 95. If there was any doubt that the states had 
widely divergent interests or that some level of distrust existed among the states 
in commercial matters, those doubts were put to rest when, prior to the 
Constitutional Convention, John Jay proposed the surrender of American rights 
to use the Mississippi River in exchange for a “generous commercial agreement” 
with Spain. Id. The northeastern states voted in favor of the proposal, believing 
that they would benefit from increased trade with Spain; the plan, however, “set 
off alarm bells throughout Virginia and settlements on the western frontier, 
where . . . Jay’s proposal conjured up the specter of a northeastern conspiracy to 
sell out western interests for eastern profits.” Id. 
 71. See Williams, supra note 64, at 427 (“[T]rade-inhibiting state regulations 
and taxes are likely to encourage retaliatory measures by those states whose 
citizens are adversely affected by the measures”) (citing Donald H. Regan, The 
Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1114 (1986)). 
 72. STORY, supra note 68, at § 497. 
 73. ELLIS, supra note 1, at 105. 
 74. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1824) (noting the “prevailing 
motive” in the adoption of the Constitution “was to regulate commerce,” and the 
“immediate origin” of the country’s foundation derived from the “necessities of 
commerce”); see also In re State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. 204, 214 (1870) 
(noting that it was the regulations imposed by the states upon each other which 
“led to the abandonment of the Confederation and to the more perfect union 
under the present Constitution.”); Williams, supra note 64, at 425 (“The 
weaknesses of the Confederation-era system of commercial regulation . . . was 
one of the primary reasons that the Constitutional Convention was called.”) 
(citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949)). 
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enhanced Congressional authority over commerce.”75 In this way, the 
Founders hoped to rescue the nation from “the embarrassing and 
destructive consequences” resulting from division among the states and 
place the power to create uniform laws in the hands of a strong national 
government.76 
There was little debate among those present at the Philadelphia 
Convention “regarding the need to divest states of their authority over 
interstate commerce.”77 The Framers successfully argued that free trade 
among the states was desirable, as unrestrained trade would “advance 
the trade of each by an exchange of their respective productions.”78 
Desirable free trade among states would work to “foster economic 
wealth,” and reduce the political and economic friction that had existed 
among the states leading up to the Constitutional Convention.79 
In the Constitution, the “power to regulate commerce [is] given to 
Congress in comprehensive terms.”80 The goals of free trade and 
restraint on individual states’ control over economic matters manifested 
themselves in the positive grants of power to the Congress in Section 8 
of Article I81 and in a number of the clauses prohibiting state action 
under Section 10 of the same Article.82 The focus of the prohibitions in 
Section 10 was on enhancing the economic unity of the country.83 To 
accomplish this, the Constitution prohibited the states from coining 
money, establishing a system of paper currency, or making any law 
impairing the obligations of contracts.84 Further, in the “import/export 
clause,” the Framers prohibited the states from laying any duties on 
 
 75. FERLING, supra note 3, at 273; see also STORY, supra note 68, § 499 (“[T]here 
will be a uniformity of operations and arrangements upon all subjects of the 
common welfare under the guidance of a single head; instead of multifarious, 
and often conflicting systems by distinct states.”). 
 76. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 12. 
 77. Williams, supra note 64, at 424. 
 78. THE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton advocated 
strongly for open trade among the states, noting that “[i]nterstate trade, at the 
moment negligible in a new nation of former colonies that had focused on 
imperial markets, would be enhanced” under the strong federal Constitution. 
FERLING, supra note 3, at 349. 
 79. Williams, supra note 64, at 426 (discussing the desirability of free trade 
among the states). 
 80. S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31, 32 (1867). 
 81. In Section 8 of Article I, the U.S. Constitution states, in relevant part, that 
“Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises 
. . . ; To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; To regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; . 
. . To coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
1–3, 5. 
 82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
SUOZZI_FMT3.DOC 12/11/2009  3:10:54 PM 
302 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:2 
imports or exports beyond those which are “absolutely necessary for 
executing its inspection laws,”85 with the intent of encouraging free 
trade among the states.86 These Sections were supplemented by the 
Tonnage Clause, which prevented a state from circumventing the 
prohibition on import and export duties via taxation on the vessels 
carrying those goods in and out of the state.87 The Clause, proposed by 
Delegate John Langdon, a member of the New Hampshire delegation,88 
“caused no significant debate at the Constitutional Convention,”89 and 
became a part of the document that was the product of that Convention. 
C.  Building in Exceptions: The Evolution of the Tonnage Clause in 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The Framers, as they did so often throughout the text of the 
Constitution, left the Tonnage Clause short, simple, and open to 
interpretation, indicating only that a state shall not “lay any Duty of 
Tonnage.”90 Though it is clear that the Framers intended the Clause to 
limit the states’ power to tax commerce,91 the text does not indicate the 
scope of the Clause nor does it define “Duty of Tonnage.” As a result of 
this ambiguity, the Court has been required to interpret the Clause. In 
doing so, the Court has extended the Clause’s application past its literal 
meaning in some aspects, while at the same time softening what at first 
glance appears to be an absolute prohibition. Over time, the Clause has 
been interpreted generally to limit a state’s ability to impose taxes that 
 
 85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
 86. See S.S. Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31, 33 (1867) (the Constitution had 
the “obvious intent” of placing the commerce among the states “beyond 
interruption or embarrassment arising from the conflicting or hostile State 
regulations.”). 
 87. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 296, 
U.S. 261, 264–65 (1935) (“the prohibition against the imposition of any duty of 
tonnage was due to the desire of the framers to supplement article 1, § 10, cl. 2”) 
(citing Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31, 35 (1867), and Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 
87–88 (1877)); see also BITTKER , supra note 52, § 12.10 (stating that the Tonnage 
Clause functions as a “textual backstop” to the import/export clause). 
 88. See Delegates to the Constitutional Convention: New Hampshire, 
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTrials/conlaw/marrynewhamp.
html. (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 89. MEESE, ET AL., supra note 1, at 178–79. In fact, James Madison, never 
reticent to speak at length on any topic relating to the Constitution, claimed that 
the reasons behind the Tonnage Clause were “so obvious . . . that they may be 
passed over without remark.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 44 (James Madison). 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 91. BITTKER, supra note 52, § 12.10. 
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operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering or leaving a 
port.92 
1.  Expansion of the Clause: “All Duties, Regardless of Their Name or 
Form” 
From the outset, the notion of what constituted a “Duty of 
Tonnage” was not interpreted literally. To the Framers, “tonnage” did 
not refer to a literal calculation of the capacity of a ship for carrying 
freight, measured in tons;93 instead, the Framers intended the Clause to 
refer to any taxes based on the internal cubic carrying capacity of a 
vessel.94 More generally, “duties of tonnage” were known among men of 
commerce of the time to refer to “levies upon the privilege of access by 
vessels or goods to the ports.”95 This divination of the Framers’ apparent 
intent in the Clause’s construction led the Court to expand the Tonnage 
Clause to encompass all duties and taxes that impose a charge on ships 
for the privilege of entering a port, whether that charge was based on 
the storage capacity of the vessel or on some other measure.96 
In Steamship Co. v. Portwardens,97 the Court addressed a Louisiana 
statute that entitled the wardens of the port of New Orleans to impose a 
flat fee of five dollars on every vessel that entered the port.98 The Court 
recognized that the flat fee was imposed regardless of the size or 
capacity of the vessel and thus did not technically constitute a “duty on 
tonnage.”99 In spite of the fact that the Louisiana statute was not 
“proportioned to the tonnage of the vessel,” the Court nonetheless held 
that it was an unconstitutional “duty on tonnage.”100 Looking to the 
Framers’ intent, the Court determined that the Tonnage Clause was 
meant not only to prohibit a pro rata tax based on the vessel’s carrying 
capacity, but “any duty on the ship, whether a fixed sum upon its whole 
 
 92. Id.; see also Clyde Mallory Lines, 269 U.S. at 266–67. 
 93. See supra note 54. 
 94. Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265 (“At the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution ‘tonnage’ was a well-understood commercial term signifying in 
America the internal cubic capacity of a vessel.”) (citing Inman S.S. Co. v. Tinker, 
94 U.S. 238, 243 (1876))); see also In re State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. 204, 212 
(1870) (“[T]he word tonnage, as applied to American ships and vessels, must be 
held to mean their entire internal cubical capacity . . . .”); BITTKER, supra note 52, 
§ 12.10 n.137 (discussing the etymology of “tonnage” as a “measure of volume 
rather than weight” in maritime terminology). 
 95. Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265. 
 96. Id. at 265–66. 
 97. 73 U.S. 31 (1867). 
 98. See id. at 32. 
 99. Id. at 34. 
 100. Id. 
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tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of 
tonnage with the rate of duty.”101 
The expansion of the Clause past the initial notion of prohibiting 
duties based on a vessel’s carrying capacity occurred in other 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Tonnage Clause cases before 
the Supreme Court. A number of cases explicitly referenced the 
Portwardens decision, agreeing that the prohibition on duties of tonnage 
was meant to include any duty imposed on a ship for the privilege of 
entering a port.102 This included Cannon v. New Orleans,103 holding that a 
tax of ten cents per ton levied on ships was unconstitutional because it 
was a tax for the privilege of landing or mooring in the city’s port;104 In 
re State Tonnage Tax Cases,105 holding that an Alabama tax levied on ships 
at the rate of $1 per ton violated the Tonnage Clause, since it reflected a 
duty on the ship for the privilege of using Alabama’s ports;106 and Inman 
Steamship Co. v. Tinker,107 which looked to the substance of the tax rather 
than its name in determining that a fee imposed on ships based on their 
tonnage was unconstitutional.108 
Early Supreme Court cases also made it clear that the prohibition 
would extend to duties on ships if those duties would “effect the same 
purpose” as imposing a charge on the duty of tonnage.109 The Court 
noted that any tax that was imposed on, for example, the “number of 
masts, or of mariners, the size and power of the steam-engine, or the 
number of passengers which she carries,” would have substantially the 
same effect as a tax based on the carrying capacity of the vessel.110 Thus, 
the Clause was read to extend to these similar types of taxes, to prevent 
states from easily sidestepping the “tonnage” language. 
2.  Exceptions: Fees for Services 
While the Court was expanding the Tonnage Clause to encompass 
all taxes that operated as a charge for the privilege of entering a port, 
 
 101. Id. at 35. 
 102. See BITTKER, supra note 52, § 12.10. 
 103. 87 U.S. 577 (1874). 
 104. Id. at 581. 
 105. 79 U.S. 204 (1870). 
 106. Id. at 217. 
 107. 94 U.S. 238 (1876). 
 108. Id. at 243–44; see also Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks 
Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265–66 (1935) (“[T]he prohibition against tonnage duties 
has been deemed to embrace all taxes and duties regardless of their name or 
form, and even though not measured by the tonnage of the vessel, which 
operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering in, trading in, or lying in 
a port.”). 
 109. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 458–59 (1849). 
 110. Id. 
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whether or not they were based on tonnage per se, the Court was 
simultaneously establishing an important exception to the Tonnage 
Clause, by refusing to extend the Clause to encompass taxes imposed by 
states, “even though graduated according to tonnage, for services 
rendered to and enjoyed by the vessel, such as pilotage . . . or 
wharfage.”111 Cases where the Court invoked the Tonnage Clause to 
strike down fees charged for “mere entry into a port” were contrasted 
with cases where a vessel was required to pay for “use of the state’s 
maritime facilities or for services rendered.”112 
The Court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens113 upheld a pilotage fee 
imposed upon vessels by the Port of Philadelphia.114 The Court noted 
that imposts on tonnage were, in the time of the Framers, “known to the 
commerce of a civilized world to be as distinct from fees and charges for 
pilotage . . . as they were from charges for wharfage or towage, or any 
other local port charges for services rendered to vessels or cargoes.”115 
Similarly, the Court in Packet Co. v. Keokuk,116 citing to Cooley, found 
that a fee based on tonnage imposed for docking at the town’s wharf 
could not be considered a duty of tonnage, as the Constitutional Framers 
could not, when they drafted the Tonnage Clause, have “had in mind 
charges for services rendered or for conveniences furnished to vessels in 
port, which are facilities to commerce rather than hindrances to its 
freedom.”117 The Court also upheld similar wharfage fees based on 
tonnage in Packet Co. v. St. Louis,118 noting that the fees were “paid as 
compensation for the use of an improved wharf and not for the mere 
privilege of stopping at the port” and were “reasonable in amount.”119 
In Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Commission,120 
regulations establishing a “schedule of harbor fees for mooring and 
shifting vessels in the harbor,” including a separate fee for vessels “500 
tons and over” were at issue.121 The Supreme Court found that the fee, 
though based on tonnage, was a “reasonable charge for a service” 
 
 111. Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 266. 
 112. BITTKER, supra note 52, § 12.10. 
 113. 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
 114. Id. at 313–14. 
 115. Id. at 314. 
 116. 95 U.S. 80 (1877). 
 117. Id. at 87–88; see also BITTKER, supra note 52, § 12.10. 
 118. 100 U.S. 423 (1879). 
 119. Id. at 427, 429. The Court also upheld fees for wharfing (see, e.g., Packet 
Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887); Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1883); 
Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg 105 U.S. 559 (1881)), as well as fees for the uses of 
locks (see Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543 (1886)). 
 120. 296 U.S. 261 (1935). 
 121. Id. at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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provided by Alabama—namely, the policing of the harbor.122 Though 
the benefit to the ships was not as direct as in the wharfage cases, the 
vessels nonetheless received a clear benefit from the policing, as the 
local government’s police activities ensured the safety of the vessels 
while they were present in the harbor.123 
3.  Vessels Taxed As Property 
In In re State Tonnage Tax Cases,124 the Supreme Court held that a 
levy that taxed ships at a rate of $1 per ton for the privilege of using the 
state’s ports was an unconstitutional violation of the Tonnage Clause.125 
Despite its holding, the Court explicitly noted that taxes levied “as on 
property,” based on a valuation of that property, were not prohibited by 
the Constitution.126 The Court noted that ships owned by individuals 
were, when viewed as property, “plainly within the taxing power of the 
States.”127 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded this notion in 
Transportation Co. v. Wheeling.128 The Wheeling decision—relevant 
historically because it established an important exception to the normal 
Tonnage Clause jurisprudence, and relevant to the instant litigation 
because it was the decision misinterpreted by the Court in Polar 
Tankers—contained a vital clause relied on by both the plurality and the 
dissent in Polar Tankers.129 In Wheeling, the state of West Virginia 
authorized the city of Wheeling to collect an annual tax on “personal 
property in the city,” which included certain ships that used the city’s 
ports.130 The Court repeated the doctrine established in In re State 
Tonnage Tax Cases, noting that taxes levied by a state upon vessels are 
“not within the prohibition of the Constitution” if they are taxed as 
property, rather than as “vehicles of commerce.”131 The Court went 
further and declared that “vessels of all kinds are liable to taxation as 
 
 122. Id. at 267. 
 123. Id. at 266–67; see also Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. 577, 581 (1874) 
(although the Supreme Court determined that the tax in question was a violation 
of the Tonnage Clause, the Court nonetheless made it clear that a city should be 
“allowed to exact and receive . . . reasonable compensation” when it assists 
vessels landing within its limits and making use of the structures that it has built 
with its own money). 
 124. 79 U.S. 204 (1870). 
 125. Id. at 217. 
 126. Id. at 205. 
 127. Id. at 213. 
 128. 99 U.S. 273 (1878). 
 129. See generally Polar Tankers v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009); id. at 
2290 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130. Wheeling, 99 U.S. at 277. 
 131. Id. at 279, 283. 
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property in the same manner as other personal property owned by 
citizens of the State,” and that the Tonnage Clause prohibitions only 
come into play where ships “are not taxed in the same manner as the 
other property of the citizens, or where the tax is imposed upon a vessel 
as an instrument of commerce, without reference to the value as 
property.”132 The Court held that the taxes did not violate the Tonnage 
Clause, as they were levied on the ships as property and were based on 
the ships’ value.133 The Supreme Court in Polar Tankers relied heavily on 
the “in the same manner” language from Wheeling, and though both the 
plurality and the dissent cited to the same language, their conflicting 
interpretations led them to divide sharply on the implications of the 
Wheeling decision. 
III.  THE OPINIONS 
Following the implementation of the Valdez tax in 1999, various 
shipping companies challenged the tax in Alaska Superior Court for the 
Third Judicial District, alleging that the tax violated the Due Process, 
Commerce, and Tonnage Clauses of the United States Constitution.134 In 
2004, the superior court held that the tax was an unconstitutional levy in 
violation of the Tonnage Clause.135 After the City moved for 
reconsideration in 2005, the superior court held that the tax violated the 
Due Process and Commerce Clauses but reversed its position on the 
Tonnage Clause issue, concluding that the tax did not violate the 
Tonnage Clause.136 Both Polar Tankers and the City appealed to the 
Alaska Supreme Court, with the City challenging the Due Process and 
Commerce Clause rulings and Polar Tankers challenging the superior 
court’s final Tonnage Clause ruling.137 
A.  The Alaska Supreme Court Decision 
Justice Eastaugh, writing for a unanimous Alaska Supreme Court, 
reversed the ruling of the superior court and held for the City, 
determining that the tax did not violate the Commerce, Due Process, or 
 
 132. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. 
 134. City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, 182 P.3d 614, 616 (Alaska 2008). 
Following the initial suit, the City entered into settlements with nearly all of the 
litigants. Id. at 617. 
 135. Id; see also Agenda Statement, Draft of Release and Settlement Agreement 
between ConocoPhillips and the City of Valdez (Oct. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.ci.valdez.ak.us/clerk/documents/NB2102008.pdf. 
 136. Polar Tankers, 182 P.3d at 617. 
 137. Id. 
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Tonnage Clauses of the federal Constitution.138 On the Tonnage Clause 
issue, the court determined that Valdez’s tax was a “fairly apportioned 
ad valorem tax on personal property,” and thus did not run afoul of the 
Constitution.139 The court noted that the property tax was used to 
support services “available to all taxpayers in the city,” including the 
employees of Polar Tankers, and thus functioned as a normal property 
tax.140 
The court noted that Polar Tankers’ brief argued that the tax was 
invalid based on an interpretation of the language in Wheeling that a tax 
must be applied “in the same manner” as it is applied to other 
property.141 The court determined instead that, since the City taxed the 
ships based on their value and at the same rate as it did other property, it 
complied with the Supreme Court’s holding in Wheeling.142 Since the tax 
thus reflected a normal tax on property rather than an imposition on 
vessels for the privilege of entering the City’s port, it was not an 
improper duty on tonnage.143 
Following the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision, Polar Tankers filed 
for certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, arguing 
(among other claims) that the Valdez tax violated the Tonnage Clause.144 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the case on June 15, 
2009. 
B.  Plurality: Improper Duties of Tonnage 
A plurality of the Supreme Court reversed the Alaska Supreme 
Court’s decision, holding that the tax violated the prohibition against 
tonnage duties.145 Noting that the Valdez tax ordinance applied 
primarily to oil tankers and did not apply to any other form of personal 
property, the plurality held that the Valdez ordinance was effectively a 
levy specifically “designed to impose a charge for the privilege of 
entering” the port, in violation of the Tonnage Clause.146 
The plurality also attempted to divine the intent of the Framers, 
noting that the Clause should be read in light of its purpose, which was 
 
 138. Id. at 617–22, 624. 
 139. Id. at 622. 
 140. Id. at 623 (citing Bigelow v. Dep’t of Taxes, 652 A.2d 985, 988 (Vt. 1994)). 
 141. Polar Tankers, 182 P.3d at 623; see also Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Polar Tankers, Inc., at *11–12, Polar Tankers, 182 P.3d 614, 2006 WL 4545044 (Nov. 
15, 2006). 
 142. Polar Tankers, 182 P.3d at 623. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 28, at *7–8. 
 145. See Polar Tankers v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2009). 
 146. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to “restrai[n] the states from the exercise of the taxing power injuriously 
to the interests of each other.”147 Further, the Court noted that the 
Framers had recognized the dangers inherent in allowing states to tax 
the vessels that used their ports and that states should not be allowed to 
“evade the Clause” at their discretion.148 
Importantly, the plurality also addressed the City’s contention that 
the tax was a personal property tax based on the value of the 
property.149 Citing Wheeling, the Court determined that the requirement 
to tax in the “same manner” is vital if the tax is to be viewed as a 
personal property tax.150 Since the relevant Municipal Code Section 
applied only to ships using the Valdez harbor, and to no other forms of 
personal property, the Court held that the vessels were not taxed in the 
“same manner” as other property, and thus the Valdez tax did not 
qualify as an ad valorem personal property tax under Wheeling.151 
C.  Concurring in the Judgment: A Plain Language View 
The concurrence took a more extreme stance in deciding that the 
tax was unconstitutional. Looking to the language of the Tonnage 
Clause, the concurring Justices concluded that the Tonnage Clause 
prohibits any duty of tonnage, “regardless of how that duty compares to 
other commercial taxes.”152 The concurrence noted that a tax in this 
manner on maritime commerce is per se unconstitutional, and a 
violation of what they viewed as a straightforward clause could not be 
overcome by simply bundling the tax on tonnage with taxes on “other 
activities or property.”153 
The concurring judges used a simple deductive argument: (1) since 
the Valdez tax was a duty imposed for the privilege of entering a port, it 
was a duty of tonnage; (2) the Tonnage Clause prohibits a state from 
laying “any Duty of Tonnage”; (3) therefore, the matter should be 
concluded, and questions of taxation of other property in the “same 
manner” should not be reached.154 The Justices recognized that this may 
cause vessels to receive preferential treatment because they are 
essentially exempt from property taxes, but they disregarded the 
 
 147. Id. at 2279 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 148. See id. at 2279–80. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2288. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 2288–89. 
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argument, noting that “[s]uch protection reflects the high value the 
Framers placed on the free flow of maritime commerce.”155 
D.  Dissent: A Property Tax 
The dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court in Polar Tankers 
agreed with the decision of the Alaska Supreme Court and determined 
that the Valdez tax was a property tax and therefore not in violation of 
the Tonnage Clause.156 The dissenting opinion noted that the ships had 
sufficient contacts with the City through the use of its port to establish 
tax situs,157 and that the City was therefore permitted to levy a property 
tax “in proportion to the ship’s contacts with the jurisdiction.”158 The 
dissent noted that the tax had the “critical characteristics of a property 
tax”: namely, that the ships were taxed based on their value and were 
only taxed after they had established a tax situs in the City.159 
The dissent relied upon Wheeling and determined that the Tonnage 
Clause would only come into play if the ships were not taxed “in the 
same manner” as other property, or if the tax was imposed without 
reference to the value of the ships.160 The dissent reasoned that Wheeling 
and In re State Tonnage Tax Cases held that any tax based on the value of 
a ship, rather than its tonnage, would not be in violation of the Tonnage 
Clause. The dissent thus concluded that the plurality misinterpreted the 
cases by requiring a state to impose similar taxes on other forms of 
property.161 The dissent, however, noted that even if the plurality’s 
interpretation of Wheeling was correct and the Tonnage Clause 
permitted a jurisdiction to apply a tax to ships only when that 
jurisdiction also taxes other property in the “same manner,” multiple 
sections under the Valdez Municipal Code tax property using the same 
“value-based” criteria as it did for ships.162 Since the City taxes other 
property “at the same rate,” the dissent stated that the plurality opinion 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2289 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 157. The dissenting opinion details the substantial impact that the “prolonged 
physical presence” of the company’s ships had on the municipal resources 
provided by the City. Id. at 2292. 
 158. Id. at 2291 n.1 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 
434, 442–43 (1979)). 
 159. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. 2293 (2009). 
 160. Id. (quoting Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 284 (1879) and In re 
State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. 204, 213–14 (1870) (“[T]axes levied on ships as 
property, based on a valuation of the same as property, are not within the 
prohibition of the Constitution.”)). 
 161. Id. at 2291. 
 162. Id. at 2293. 
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was incorrect in its assertion that ships entering the port had been 
“singled out for taxation.”163 
IV.  A MISINTERPRETATION OF PRECEDENT 
The plurality and concurring opinions in the Supreme Court’s 
decision misinterpreted the Court’s prior Tonnage Clause jurisprudence 
and overturned a property tax that was, in reality, an appropriate charge 
on the shipping vessels that routinely utilized the port at Valdez. 
Specifically, the concurring opinion failed to take into account the 
modifications to the Clause’s interpretation in prior Supreme Court 
opinions, and the plurality opinion misinterpreted the holding in 
Wheeling by finding that the property tax applied to “no other form of 
personal property.”164 Further, both opinions failed to take into account 
relevant policy considerations that support permitting states and local 
jurisdictions such as Valdez to implement these types of taxes. 
A.  The Concurrence’s Plain Language View Ignores Supreme Court 
Jurisprudence 
Though appealing in its simplicity, the opinion of the concurring 
Justices fails to take into account prior Supreme Court decisions on the 
Tonnage Clause and the overall evolution of that Clause. The 
concurrence, when it claims that any Duty of Tonnage is 
unconstitutional, fails to account for the exception developed in In re 
State Tonnage Tax Cases and Wheeling, permitting states to impose a tax 
on ships “as property.”165 The precedential value of those opinions was 
ignored by the concurring Justices, who instead reverted back to a strict 
reading of the Clause’s language, claiming that because the ordinance 
imposes a tax based on tonnage, it is in violation of the plain language of 
the Tonnage Clause, ending the inquiry.166 
The concurrence does raise important arguments about the 
Framers’ desire for freedom in interstate maritime commerce,167 but 
these general invocations of the Framers’ intent should not supersede 
the deficiencies present in the concurring opinion’s failure to adhere to 
Supreme Court precedent regarding the Tonnage Clause.168 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 2283. 
 165. See Wheeling, 99 U.S. at 279; In re State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. at 213. 
 166. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2288–89. 
 167. Id. 
 168. The concurring opinion attempts to downplay the importance of 
Wheeling and In re State Tonnage Tax Cases by claiming that those cases are only 
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B.  The Plurality Misapplied the Wheeling Decision 
The plurality opinion declared that, since the Valdez ordinance 
applies to ships that use the port at Valdez while applying to “no other 
form of personal property,” the ships are not taxed “in the same 
manner” as other property under the Wheeling standard.169 The plurality 
claims that, for a tax on a ship’s tonnage to be valid under Wheeling, 
similar taxes must be imposed upon other businesses, which will 
operate as a “check upon a State’s ability to impose a tax on ships at 
rates that reflect an effort to take economic advantage of the port’s 
geographically based position.”170 
This interpretation presents a compelling and valid concern, which, 
though never stated explicitly, can be pieced together through 
examination of the plurality’s opinion. In practical terms, the plurality is 
troubled over the potential ability of a state or local municipality to 
impose a tax on ships entering its ports at whatever rate it desires, and 
the Court is most concerned about the potential for rates to “get out of 
hand.”171 Past Supreme Court cases (specifically, Wheeling and In re State 
Tonnage Tax Cases) have shown that a balance must be maintained 
between the right of a state to tax the property that makes use of its 
services and the constitutional prohibition on states taxing ships merely 
for the privilege of entering their ports. 
The fear of the plurality in Polar Tankers and the Court in Wheeling 
can be addressed through a simple example: suppose that a tax is levied 
on ships, but all other local property is exempt from similar tax rates. In 
this case, a 2% tax (like the one implemented by Valdez) on the value of 
the ships may seem to be a relatively minor tariff. However, if the City 
faces a budget shortfall and decides to tax the ships at 40% of their 
value, the non-resident shipping companies, unable to vote in Valdez, 
will not be in a position to contest the tax. Similarly, the owners of other 
local property (who do have a say in the political process) would be 
indifferent to the tax increase on the non-resident shipping companies; 
40% multiplied by the residents’ tax base results in the same amount of 
tax to these individuals as 2% multiplied by the zero base. In fact, given 
that the tax would be used to support municipal improvements but 
 
applicable where property is owned by citizens of the state imposing the tax. Id. 
at 2288. Both the plurality and the dissent discount the use of this “home port 
doctrine,” noting that the doctrine “has been abandoned,” and states have long 
been permitted to “tax vessels belonging to citizens of other States.” Id. at 2287, 
2291 n.2. 
 169. Id. at 2284–85. 
 170. Id. at 2285. 
 171. Id. 
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would not come out of local taxpayers’ pockets, those citizens would 
likely be in favor of such a tax increase. Therefore, if other local property 
is not taxed at the same rate (or, in the words of Wheeling, “in the same 
manner”172) as ships, then the state is free to tax at whatever rate it 
pleases, likely resulting in an “embarrassing and destructive” restriction 
on free commerce among the states.173 
If, however, the vessels are taxed “in the same manner” as other 
local property, and local businesses are subject to the same tax rates, 
then there will be a sufficient “electorate-related check . . . upon the 
City’s vessel-taxing power.”174 Any attempts by the City to increase the 
tax on the ships that is accompanied by a concurrent increase in the tax 
on property owned by local individuals and businesses that have direct 
influence on the political process will implicate “political concern[s]” 
and become a “potential ballot-box issue,” and the impact of the tax 
increase on local property owners will provide a safeguard against 
excessive taxation on those ships using the City’s ports.175 
The dissent’s primary contention, that Wheeling only requires that 
property taxes be based on the value of the ship rather than its 
tonnage,176 is insufficient to solve this problem, as, in the absence of a 
parallel tax on other local property, the tax rate could still be raised at 
will by the City. Nonetheless, the dissent’s argument in the alternative 
still holds weight, and reflects the optimal result in this case based on 
both past Supreme Court cases and practical considerations. 
Both sides agreed that the Valdez Municipal Code section 
authorizing the tax “applies only to ships.”177 For the plurality, this ends 
the inquiry, as the ships are not taxed in the “same manner” as other 
property.178 This opinion, however, ignores the presence of “other 
property in the city [that] is also subject to taxation” at the same rate.179 
Under a different section of the Valdez Municipal Code, a value-based 
property tax is imposed on “trailers, mobile homes, and recreational 
vehicles that are affixed to a site and connected to utilities.”180 The 
dissent notes that the taxability of these types of property under section 
3.12.022 of the Valdez Municipal Code is “determined much in the same 
way as the taxability of ships,” as the property under both sections may 
 
 172. Transp. Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 284 (1878). 
 173. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11 (1824). 
 174. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2287. 
 175. Id. at 2285, 2287. 
 176. Id. at 2291. 
 177. Id. at 2282, 2292; see also VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020 (2008). 
 178. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2285. 
 179. Id. at 2292; see also City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 182 P.3d 614, 623 
(Alaska 2008). 
 180. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.022). 
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be taxed if it meets a “ninety day” requirement.181 In both cases, the 
property has been assessed a tax only after establishing sufficient 
contacts with the city, and the tax rate levied on the property in both 
cases is the same.182 
Since this other property is treated in the same manner and taxed at 
the same rate, the fears of the Court here and the Court in Wheeling 
should be put to rest. As a result of the interests of the owners of the real 
and personal property who are taxed at the same rate and in the same 
manner as the ships, the City is subject to the safeguards of the political 
process and does not have unfettered discretion to set whatever price it 
desires. 
If the rate applied to ships was different than the rate applied to 
other types of property, or if the tax truly applied only to ships and no 
other form of property, then the plurality would have been correct in its 
interpretation of Wheeling and its opinion in this case. Since, however, 
other personal and real property was taxed in the same manner and at 
the same rate, the Valdez ordinance was an ad valorem property tax, 
imposed with the safeguards of the democratic process. For this reason, 
pure ad valorem property taxes, like the one adopted under Valdez’s 
municipal code, if applied in the same manner as other local property 
taxes, should not be considered unconstitutional duties on tonnage in 
violation of the federal Constitution. 
C.  Congressional Approval 
The Tonnage Clause does note that the states can gain the “Consent 
of Congress” if they wish to impose a duty of Tonnage.183 In theory, this 
requirement was meant to ensure that Congress would have the “final 
exercise of this important power” to prevent the states from hindering 
trade.184 The Framers recognized that a congressional approval 
requirement would be beneficial to the purposes behind the Tonnage 
Clause, as it would ensure that “each state will be informed of, and 
heard on, potentially threatening sister-state activities.”185 Further, the 
proponents of a tonnage tax would be required to “mobilize the 
requisite majorities at the federal level, thus affording an added measure 
 
 181. A trailer or mobile home may be taxed if it has “remained at a fixed site 
for more than ninety days.” VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.022(C). Similarly, a ship 
establishes a tax situs in Valdez if it is “used within the city for any ninety days 
or more.” VALDEZ MUN. CODE § 3.12.020(C)(2)(c). 
 182. Polar Tankers, 129 S. Ct. at 2292. 
 183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage”) (emphasis added). 
 184. Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. 577, 583 (1874). 
 185. MEESE, ET AL., supra note 1, at 179. 
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of security.”186 Critics of property taxes based on tonnage of ships could 
claim that if a state truly wants a justifiable tax, then it could simply ask 
Congress.187 
A balance, however, must be reached between the clear desires of 
the Framers for freedom of commerce among the states and the needs of 
states and cities to independently impose taxes on those corporations 
who frequently make use of their ports. States should not be required to 
ask permission at the federal level to implement a tax on certain 
property that routinely makes use of local utilities and services. Such a 
position, essentially enabling federal oversight over matters of taxation 
that are distinctly local, would be as offensive to a republican system of 
government as an overabundance of power in the hands of the states. 
A similar policy argument made against the Valdez tax is that it 
would have the effect of passing the tax burden on to the lower forty-
eight states. If the shipping companies were required to pay a tax to ship 
oil, the costs of production and transportation would rise, and this cost 
would be passed on to the ultimate consumers. These consumers, 
however, are the same people who derive an indirect benefit from the 
City’s maintenance of the port, which enables a substantial amount of 
domestic oil to enter into the market, increasing the supply and pushing 
down the price. A property tax on the ships that bring this oil to market, 
properly tied to the vessels’ use of the port and restricted by similarities 
to other local property taxes, would be just compensation for the 
services provided by the City of Valdez and the State of Alaska in 
helping to bring the valuable resource to consumers in the lower forty-
eight states. 
The statute implemented by the City of Valdez, if phrased 
differently, may have passed Supreme Court review. The statute could 
have explicitly tied the percentage rate charged to the vessels to the 
statutory sections that taxed other property within city limits, with an 
indication that the tax rate charged to ships could not rise unless the tax 
rate for other personal property increased at the same rate. Though this 
construction would likely not have swayed the concurring Justices, it 
may have influenced the remaining Justices by bringing into sharper 
focus the rule elucidated in Wheeling and In re State Tonnage Tax Cases: 
that when ships are taxed as property, in the same manner as other 
personal property in the jurisdiction, there is no violation of the Tonnage 
Clause. 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Cannon, 87 U.S. at 583 (“[If] the just necessities of a local commerce 
require a tax that is otherwise forbidden, it is presumed that Congress would not 
withhold its assent if properly informed and its consent requested.”). 
